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764 this redemption went to the poor, but now it goes to the mullah. The graves are not dug very deeply (one to two arshin) and sometimes have a side niche in which the deceased is placed (in the "akhret") slightly on his side, facing Mecca. The niche is blocked off with stones or wood and earth is sprinkled over the top. Those present throw handfuls of earth on the grave. Places that are conspicuous and frequented by people, beside great roads and always on a hill, mound, or mountain, are chosen for graves, for in this way honor is shown to the dead. Memorials of the most varied forms and various cost are raised above the graves. Most of them are of sod, but there are also whole mausoleums, for example, the tombs of Alach, Kurpech, Ablai, etc. Graves are honored by the Kirghiz /Kazak/ as sacred places.

• 779 The Kirghiz /Kazak/ profess Islam. Most of them adopted this faith in the first quarter of the 14th century, during the rule of the khan Uzbek (in the Golden Horde). The teachers of Islam were mullahs of Khiva, Bukhara, and Tashkent. The Kirghiz /Kazak/ consider themselves of the Sunnite sect, i.e., they recognize as holy books the life of Mohammed and others, in addition to the Koran. It is known that the true Sunnites have a deep hatred for the Shiites (who do not recognize these books), hating them even more than Christians. The Kirghiz /Kazak/, however, not only do not exhibit this intolerance, but are instead even indifferent to their religion. Religious strife is foreign to them, and they observe few rituals. In general the Kirghiz /Kazak/ are bad Moslems. Formerly the clerical estate was made up of hadjis (descendants of the fourth generation of Mohammed Ali, who wear the green turban) and mullahs. Later the spiritual leaders (mullahs) were fugitive, barely literate Kazan Tatars who escaped recruit duty in the steppe. Among the illiterate and ignorant people it was not difficult for these people to pose as true mullahs. At present the Kirghiz /Kazak/ have mullahs from their own midst. For their training there are medreses (schools by the mosques, in Petropavlovsk and Semipalatinsk) where they receive elementary education. Later,

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793 to supplement their education they travel to the learned centers of Islam -- to Bukhara, Khiva, Tashkent, and Samarkand (1).

1. The volost mullah is called akhun. The chief spiritual figure (with the power of our /Eastern Orthodox/ bishop /arkhierey/) is the Mufti, who lives in European Russia.

799 Recently, with the intensification of connections with the Moslems
777 of Central Asia, /221/ Islam has begun to take deeper root.
788 /Illustration appears here./ This can be deduced indirectly by the increase of pilgrimages to Mecca. In 1901 up to 300 pilgrimage tickets were issued in Omsk.

796 Among the holidays we will mention "Kurbanayz" ("the
782 sacrifice," symbolizing the offering of Isaac as a sacrifice). On this holiday it is necessary to slaughter (offer as a sacrifice) the best male animal (horse or bull, "so that in the other world, when the sinners are driven through hell along a thin tightrope as sharp as a saber, they will have something on which to ride"). Usually one animal is slaughtered for every seven persons. According to an old custom the rich invite all the poor of the village to eat with them. The hides of the animals go to the mullah. The
796 holiday is accompanied by games and amusements. Of these the
526 races, in which girls also take part, are popular. The adults delight in the running of their best racers, while the young people amuse themselves by chasing each other. If a young man catches a girl, he is permitted to kiss her. If he fails to catch her, the girl will chase him back. This is a movable holiday.

796 In memory of the fasting of Mohammed, there has been
785 established a thirty-day "uraza" (fast), and the month of this fast is called "Ramazan." During this time the Kirghiz /Kazak/ is obliged to renounce food and drink from sunrise ("as soon as only a thread is visible") until sundown. Eating is permissible only at night. The Kirghiz /Kazak/ have adapted themselves to this by eating and drinking all night and sleeping during the daytime. In winter this fast passes easily, but in summer, when

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796 785 the day lasts 18-20 hours, fasting constitutes a great feat, especially for the poor who have to work all day. The latter therefore often do not observe it. The law permits [799] taking food for three days or three periods of three days only for [346] [493] old people, sick people, women in labor, and nursing mothers and children.

796 After "uraza," the holiday of "Ramazanayta [262] (Urazayta) begins. Like the preceding holiday



A type of urban Kirghiz /Kazak/ mosque.

it is marked by an abundant consumption of meat (mutton and horsemeat) and kumiss, and by the arrangement of various amuse-
769 ments (fights, races, etc.). In addition to these two holidays the Kirghiz /Kazak/ celebrate memorial services for their most honored dead, which are accompanied by various feasts, the usual races, competitions in horseback riding, etc.

/222/ The Kirghiz /Kazak/ have not yet emerged from
797 789 under the rule of nature. This dependence can be felt with every step of the Kirghiz /Kazak/. All the events of his life which are in some way outstanding are linked with special signs, the carrying out of various rituals, etc. The inveterate Kirghiz /Kazak/ will not depart on a long journey, for example, on a Saturday or a Tuesday for fear of misfortune, for these days are considered "dangerous." In extremity he must carry out certain ceremonies in order to protect himself from inevitable misfortune, for example, to go out the night before, taking 40 steps from the yurt in the direction of the proposed journey, and to

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kasak RQ2

Chapter 4

RELIGION

THE MOSLEM RELIGION AND THE KAZAKHS

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The Turkic peoples of Central Asia—Kazakh, Kirgiz, Uzbek, Kashgarian, Altai-Turk, Taranchi, and Sart—are divided by habitat and occupation regarding their religious practices and beliefs. The city-dwelling Turk and the farming Turk have been under Islamic influence for many centuries; the Turkic cities of Central Asia have been among the great centers of Islamic culture. The herdsmen of the Central Asiatic steppe, on the other hand, are Islamic only in circumscribed aspects of their religious life. There is an interplay between these two divisions, farmers and herders, which deserves careful treatment, for it is of especial significance today.

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No adequate survey of the religion of the Kazakhs has been made. This is unfortunate, for analysis of the various components of Kazakh religion is a complex task and one with profound significance to the purposes of psychological warfare and political understanding. There is a widespread belief among both scholars and laymen that the Kazakhs are Moslems, and should be treated accordingly. The roots of this belief lie in the past, along with certain errors regarding the language of the Kazakhs. About 80 years ago, the Russian Orientalist and political adviser V. Grigoriev, in an article entitled "Russian Policy in Asia," appended to Schuyler's Turkistan, wrote the following:[1]

> "We [Russians] imagined that the Kirghiz [Kazakhs] were the same ethnographically as our Volga Tartars, and therefore for one hundred and twenty years we carried on all our correspondence with them in the Tartar language in the full assurance that we were communicating with them in the native tongue which they fully understood while, in fact, it was exactly the same as writing to Spaniards in Italian. . . . Still worse results followed: another misunderstanding of ours was, that the Kirghiz were Mohammedans, whereas in the last [18th] century they were almost all Shamanists, and a large number of them remain so to this time. At the epoch of their nominal union with Russia only a very few of the Khans and Sultans had a confused idea of the dogmas of Islam and performed some few of its rites. Not a single mosque then existed in the Kirghiz Steppes, not a single mullah performed there the rites of the Mussulman religion, and if since that time the Kirghiz have really become Mussulman to a considerable degree, it is only owing to our taking them for Mussulmans, and to our treating them as such. As incontrovertible proof that the

[1] Schuyler (110), Vol. 2, 1876, pp. 404-406.

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> Mussulman propaganda in one form or another went into the Kirghiz Steppes from the side of Russia is the circumstance that especially those Kirghiz who live along our lines have become Mussulman, while the old genuine Shamanism is kept up, even at the present time, among those Kirghiz particularly who wander in the neighborhood of Khiva, Bukhara, and what was formerly Khokand, that is, in really Mussulman country."

Grigoriev ascribed too much importance to the weight of Russian intermediation on behalf of Islam, and thus continued the same sort of error he was describing; the Russian authorities greatly overestimated the role of Islam among the Kazakhs, while Grigoriev overestimated the role of the Russians in bringing it to them. Study of the problem of acculturation has made anthropologists today less naive concerning a people's capacity to accept or reject a given element from another culture. However, Grigoriev is correct in recording the error involved in official Russian recognition of Islam as the religion of the Kazakhs. This error is part of a still larger one, that of failing to understand the [171] cultural diversity in Central Asia, a matter which is implied by the error in language mentioned by Grigoriev. The Kazakhs have a different language from the Tartars of European Russia, as well as a different religion, economy, and social organization.

Grigoriev, on the other hand, calls attention to an important distinction regarding the religion of the Kazakhs, or as he calls them, the [565] Kirghiz: Only the ruling strata of Kazakh society had any degree of contact with Islam in the 18th century, when the Russian conquest began. This fact is independently corroborated by A. Bennigsen, who has conducted research among the Kazakh displaced persons of World War II, now living in Paris. Bennigsen writes, "It is only among certain D.P.'s who are descendants of the families of 'feudal bais' that we have observed the survival of the Moslem faith."[1] Only in families of this social class has there been any sort of Moslem tradition or learning.

The Russian empire in the 18th and 19th centuries sought to use the religion of Islam as a bridge into the society and political life of the Kazakhs. A similar tactic has been used repeatedly by the Soviet regime. [538] The results have been negligible. In the words of a modern-day Kazakh poet and novelist, Sabit Mukanov:

> "For many historical reasons, the Kazakh masses took relatively poorly to the religious traditions [of Islam], and the Kazakh woman was not subjected to the yoke of the laws of the Shariat to the same degree that, for instance, the Uzbek women were. The Kazakh women were never veiled; they took part in festivals together with men."[2]

In addition to Mukanov's statement that the Kazakh woman was not put into the harem or otherwise sealed off from the world, as the Moslem [569] woman is supposed to be, other reports indicate that the nomadic woman is notably freer than the woman of the settled villages and cities of Central Asia. This is an important index to the degree of influence which Islam practices have had on the life of the Kazakhs.

[1] Personal communication.
[2] Mukanov, 1949, p. 8.

Mukanov offers another measure of the impact of Islam in his reference to the Shariat. The Shariat is technically the canonical law of Islam. Unlike the canonical law of western civilization, however, it governs the entire life of the devout Moslem, not merely his relationship to his church. The Shariat governs, in theory, the daily habits of the Moslem, prescribes whom he may or may not marry, and sets forth the entire body of social relations and controls—between master and servant, man and woman, parent and child, ruler and governed. The fact that the very existence of this body of rules of conduct is little known among the nomadic Kazakhs is of great significance. Taken in combination with other less striking bits of evidence, it points to the superficiality of the Kazakhs' adoption of Islam. Although Moslem observance and practice is everywhere more formalized in urban than in rural surroundings, for the nomadic Kazakhs it is not merely less systematic; it is also less important.

KAZAKH FOLK RELIGIONS

At the end of the 19th century a Russian, Polarkov, traveled among the Kazakhs in the northeast of their domain, in Semirechie in the territory of the Great Horde. He learned that these Kazakhs had not seen a mullah, or Moslem cleric, until some 15 or 20 years before his travels. In the 1890's mullahs were still exceedingly rare among the Kazakhs who lived near the Chinese border. Few Kazakhs knew Moslem prayers, or if they did, only inaccurately; few knew the Koran.[1]

Because he did not overestimate the influence of Islam on the Kazakhs, Polarkov was able to supply positive details of the religions of these people. He distinguished between two layers, the remains of the old folk religion and an overlay of the new Islamic faith among the literate. The most important of the old beliefs or cults is that centered around the soul of the deceased ancestor, arvak among the Kirgiz, aurak among the Kazakhs. These ancestors represent a strong force among their living descendants and are prayed to and invoked in time of need. The ancestor cult forms an integral part of the traditional social structure of the Kazakhs, built as it is around the genealogy and the preservation of the descent line. However, according to Polarkov, the cult of ancestors was weakening under the impact of Islam on the one hand and Russian acculturation on the other.[2]

The term shamanism is often mentioned in connection with the Kazakhs. In this religion the leader, or shaman, is ecstatic, hysterical, marked by abnormal behavior (not only according to the standards of western society, but also according to his own); he is considered to be possessed by and have control over the world of the spirits, and by entering into relations with them can use them to his own will. He cures illnesses, has powers of divination, can avert misfortune and the evil eye. For many centuries he has been far in advance of western medicine by recognizing psychosomatic disorders; he concentrates on them, and so

[1] Polarkov, 1891, pp. 21-22.
[2] Ibid., pp. 23-28.

avoids ailments which his power cannot cure, such as a broken leg. The shaman generally sets himself into a state of trance, in which he projects his soul into the spirit realm and there discovers the secret cause of some human disorder, cattle plague, or whatever problem faces him. The Kazakh shaman, called bagsha, belongs to a hereditary profession. The patrilineal organization of Kazakh society is reflected in this folk religion: "The profession of bagsha is transmitted usually from father to son; this inheritance pattern bears the name of bagshylyk."[1]

This form of shamanism is widespread among the Turks and the Mongols, where the former have not been absorbed into the world of Islam, or the latter into the world of Buddhism. Kazakh shamanism is connected most intimately with the social organization of the people. The practice of animal sacrifices conducted by the shaman in the case of severe or dangerous disease, the shaman's use of the drum or tambourine (Kazakh dabyl) in his ceremonies, the passing of a shaman's spirits to his son when the shaman dies, are all part of the fabric of Turko-Mongol religion and society, just as is the cult of ancestors. However, the Kazakhs have not lived in a vacuum sealed off from the Moslem world, for they have formed part of ancient empires thoroughly Islamic in faith; the empire of Tamerlane, to which the ancestors of the Kazakhs belonged in the 14th and 15th centuries, was a Moslem empire. The bagsha's spirits are known among the Kazakhs as djinns, a Moslem term for spirits; the bagsha frequently invokes Allah, and the Arabic devil, Shaitan, is accursed and admonished.[2]

Elements of Islam have thus slipped into the folk religion of the Kazakhs, a process over which the Russians have had no control; Tsarist recognition of Islam was not needed to introduce these elements among the Kazakhs.

For an exact appraisal of the role of Islam among the Kazakhs, another ancient practice must be examined. The Kazakhs have traditionally believed in and made pilgrimages to holy places. In Central Asia one finds a vast number of such places, tombs of saints or of other holy men. These tombs, called mazar by the Kazakhs and Kirgiz, stand alone or together with several others within an earthen enclosure which forms a sacred ossuary.[3] Among devout Moslems visits to these places can even replace the pilgrimage to Mecca.

In recent years the Soviet regime has been concerned about this practice. The Party Committee of the Pavlodar Region in May 1952 called for strengthening of the natural sciences and of antireligious propaganda, with special reference to a mazar in the Bayan-Aul District, which has existed for many years. The Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan was instructed to put an end to the legends regarding the saint in the tomb. The Academy formed a committee to visit the sepulchre and examine the matter, but the committee limited itself to inscribing certain remarks in the visitor's book beside the tomb. It was denounced by the Party for its lack of effort.[4]

[1] Castagne (27), 1930, pp. 67-73.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 67-73.
[3] Castagne (29), 1951, pp. 46-50.
[4] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 24 May 52.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQZ
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EVALUATION OF ISLAM IN SOVIET KAZAKHSTAN

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The folk religion of the Kazakhs has formed a distinct block to the process of Sovietization. This does not mean that Islam among the Kazakhs is regarded as a key threat by the Soviet regime, but it can be said that the folk religion of the Kazakhs, including certain elements which that religion shares with Islam, is dangerous to the Soviets.

One may gain a clearer perspective by contrasting the situation regarding antireligious propaganda in Kazakhstan with that in Uzbekistan. Islam is singled out in the press of Soviet Uzbekistan as a central heresy. When Osman Yusupov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party, reported to the Party's 10th Congress, a large part of his report dealt with the problem of Islam among the Uzbeks. His statement concluded with a resolution to "battle against the Moslem religion."[1] A similar report given to the Fifth Kazakh Party Congress in 1951 by Shaiakhmetov, then first secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Party, made no mention of Islam as a danger in Soviet Kazakhstan.[2] At about the same time Shaiakhmetov, in a report on ideological work presented to the 88th Plenum of the Central Committee in Kazakhstan, devoted himself to the various deviations from the Party line—bourgeois nationalism, xenophobia, autonomism, idealization of the feudal past, and so forth. Again there was no mention of Islam.[3]

On the other hand the sedentary Turkic and Central Asiatic populations of Kazakhstan, such as the Uigurs and the Dungans, are repeatedly attacked for "Islamic survivals." The following attacks on religious heresies in Kazakhstan were printed in Kazakhstankaia Pravda in a little more than a year:

12 March 1952 — Article on the religious survivals (polygamy) in the Kurdai District, Dzhambul Region (a district inhabited by Dungans).

12 March 1952 — Critique of the religious mentality in South Kazakhstan Region.

14 March 1952 — Article on the religious survivals among the Dungans of Dzhambul Region.

25 March 1952 — Article denouncing the survival of the feudal mentality among the Komsomols (Young Communists) of Chimkent.

21 May 1952 — Account of the work of the Congress of Scientific Establishments convoked by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Kazakhstan, in Alma-Ata. This Congress denounced the survival of religious activity in the Kzyl-Orda and Pavlodar regions.

6 July 1952 — Article denouncing the survivals of such Islamic institutions as the harem and the sequestration of women among the Dungans of Kurdai District, Dzhambul Region.

19 September 1952 — Attack on the persistence of the Islamic tradition among the Dungans of the Kurdai District, Dzhambul Region.

[1] *Kizil Uzbekistan*, 2 Mar 49.
[2] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 16 Dec 51.
[3] *Ibid.*, 28 Oct 51.

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4 March 1952	– At the Sixth Congress of the Kazakh Komsomol, the regional committees of South Kazakhstan, Dzhambul, Kzyl-Orda, and Alma-Ata regions, were denounced for failing to combat inequalities in female education.
7 July 1953	– Article of similar tenor on the Kzyl-Orda Region.
2, 3, and 4 April 1953	– Komsomol Congress. Again survivals of traditional religion are denounced with reference to Kzyl-Orda, Dzhambul, and South Kazakhstan regions.

All the regions cited in which the religious issue has been raised lie in the southern part of Kazakhstan, with the exception of the one case noted for Pavlodar, in the north. The south is the zone of sedentary agricultural tradition, heavily Islamicized for many centuries. Moreover, in many regions of the south there is a large Uzbek population.

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Even if Grigoriev's account of the lack of Islamic influence in the southern part of the Kazakh steppe was true for his day, this situation no longer exists. Tsarist and Soviet policies have combined the Uzbeks with the Kazakhs for administrative purposes, and cultural interaction between these two peoples has increased in the past century. As a result, more of Islam has appeared among the Kazakhs in the south than in the center or the north, a reversal of the trend described by Grigoriev.

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The policy of political combination on an ever-increasing scale has also been applied to the Kazakhs in the religious domain. As a consequence, Kazakh representatives have appeared at official Soviet-Moslem congresses sponsored by Moscow, and they occupy a high place in the Moslem religious administration. The world of Islam within the USSR is divided into four regional administrations under the supreme presidency of the grand Mufti-al-Islam, whose seat is in Ufa, the capital of Soviet Bashkiria. The present incumbent is the Grand Mufti Abderrahman Rasulayev. The four regional administrations are:[1]

(1) The Spiritual Directorate of the Sunni Moslems of the RSFSR, at Ufa, Bashkir ASSR.
(2) The Spiritual Directorate of the Sunni Moslems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, at Tashkent, Uzbek SSR.
(3) The Spiritual Directorate of the Sunni Moslems of the North Caucasus, at Bunaisk, Dagestan ASSR.
(4) The Spiritual Directorate of the Shia Moslems and the Moslems of all Transcaucasia, at Baku, Azerbaijan SSR.

The second of the spiritual directorates listed governs the religious community of Islamic Central Asia; its territory comprises Uzbekistan, Kirgizia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Tadzkikistan. Its mufti, who ranks together with the three other regional Moslem chiefs directly under the Grand Mufti in Ufa, is Ishan Babakhan, and Uzbek; the second in command in Soviet Central Asia, directly under Mufti Ishan, is the Kadi Abdulgaffar Shemsuddinov, a Kazakh.[2]

The Moslem Administration of the Soviet Union has convoked a series of congresses whose timing is of great interest. A congress of all Islamic peoples of the Soviet Union was convened under the chairmanship

[1] Bezalgoss (11), 1952, pp. 12-13.
[2] *L'Oriente Moderno* (87), 1949, p. 11; *Islamic Review* (69), April 1949, pp. 80-81.

of Grand Mufti Abderrahman Rasulayev in June 1942; it called upon the world of Islam to cooperate in the defeat of Nazism.[1] The most recent of the congresses was convoked in May 1952 to denounce American agression in Korea.[2]

The policy of expediency and opportunism which has motivated the Soviet manipulation of the Islamic peoples within its borders need not be discussed here. Activities of the Islamic hierarchy have been permitted and supported only when they have served the interests of the Soviet regime. Of greater significance is the error of hyperorganization into which the Soviet regime has fallen. It has in effect perpetuated the error of the Tsarist regime, exposed by Grigoriev, with regard to the Kazakhs and the Kirgiz. Congresses are convoked by rubber stamp to denounce that which Moscow denounces. And the membership and representation of these congresses are augmented by rubber stamp to lend the force of greater numbers to their resolutions. Thus age-old errors are carried forward into the second half of the 20th century.

In summary, then, the religion of the Kazakhs is an amalgam of aboriginal shamanism with certain borrowings from Islam among the folk cults. Since Islam in Central Asia is the religion of the sedentary farmers and the urban societies, the Kazakhs have not had very much direct contact with it, except perhaps for those among the ruling strata of Kazakh khans and sultans. Both the Tsarist and the Soviet regimes have mistakenly grouped the Kazakh nomads in the general category of Central Asiatic Moslems. Although this administrative policy may eventually result in the full incorporation of the Kazakhs into the Islamic world of Central Asia, such is far from the case today. The Pan-Islam movement, working toward the unification of all Islamic peoples, has had small visible effect on the Kazakhs. Interviews conducted in Paris, Munich, and Istanbul among Kazakh DP's point clearly to the lack of contact between the Kazakh herdsmen and Islamic influences in the 1940's. The Soviet regime sometimes adds the denunciation of "Pan-Islamicist" in the round of attack on a political heretic, but it does so by mechanical rote, drawing upon the general armament of the propagandist and the agitator. Rarely is a specific charge made against a Kazakh deviationist; never does the Kazakh press consider it necessary to root out the ideology of Pan-Islam among Kazakhs, although such is frequently the Soviet attitude toward other peoples of Soviet Central Asia.

NATIVISM

Nativism, as a religious development among people who have felt the impact of western civilization, has begun to receive considerable attention in recent anthropological literature.[3] In many parts of the world, natives have reacted to contact with the western culture by rejecting it

[1] Syria (83), 23 Jun 42; *L'Orient Moderne* (87), 1942, p. 372.
[2] Bennigsen (11), 1952.
[3] One of the sharpest formulators and most extensive contributors to the theory was the late Ralph Linton.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Kazakhstan RQ1

The figures for the number of sheep are particularly significant, since this animal is of central importance to the nomad. Mutton is virtually the nomad's only meat; sheep milk is used as much as cow or mare milk. The sheep herds did not recover from the losses of the early 1930's as well as the cattle; by 1949, the number of sheep was 15,000,000, or approximately 68 per cent of the 1929 peak. In 1953, according to a statement made by Khrushchev,[1] secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the number of sheep and goats was significantly less than it had been in 1928, the index year for current Soviet statistics on Kazakh livestock. In 1928, the number of sheep and goats had been 20,500,000, with a ratio of four sheep to one goat; hence there were approximately 16,000,000 sheep. It would appear, then, that the number of sheep has not increased since 1949; it may possibly have decreased.

The figures reported for the number of hogs in Kazakhstan provide a useful index of the degree to which Slavic farmers (Russian and Ukrainian) have moved into the republic. The pig is of European origin; it is not native to rural Turkestan and was introduced there only recently. There were 300,000 hogs in Kazakhstan in 1924 and 1929, 500,000 in 1927, and 370,000 in 1938—the only category in which a figure for the 1930's exceeds any of those for the previous decade. Kazakhs have never eaten pork, partly on religious grounds—it is taboo for Moslems—and partly on traditional grounds. The present-day importance of pork in the KSSR economy is shown by the fact that in 1953 it constituted 53 per cent of the total meat production of the republic.[2]

COLLECTIVIZATION

Of fundamental importance in understanding the Kazakh attitudes toward Sovietization is the impact which collectivization during the late twenties and early thirties had upon these attitudes. During the drive to collectivize the Kazakhs, thousands of families were handed over to the GPU, hundreds of thousands of families starved to death, and further thousands sought to escape the consequences of being identified as Kazakhs by emigrating or declaring themselves to be Uzbeks, Karakalpaks, or other neighboring peoples. (See Chapter 2.)

During the period of collectivization, the Party leader of the Kazakh republic, F. I. Goloshchekin, made a number of remarkably frank statements. In a series of articles and speeches prepared between 1928 and 1930, he described how collectivization was accomplished. In November 1928, he stated that 657 households were confiscated, and a total of 143,000 cattle units (whereby five sheep equals one head of cattle) were collectivized.[3] In an article two years later he said that a group of 696 households had been confiscated.[4] Another source reveals that some 700 Kazakh households were confiscated in 1929.[5]

[1] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 23 Oct 53.
[2] *Ibid.*, 21 Oct 53.
[3] Goloshchekin, 1931, p. 201.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 208.
[5] Kuchkin, 1946.